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Conflict/radical framework, which posits that the law is an instrument
used by the wealthy to dominate and exploit the underclass and to
preserve class distinctions (Quinney, 1970, 1977; Turk, 1969; Huff,
1980). In the conflict/radical perspective, unemployment is related
to crime, especially property crime, in a circuitous fashion. Capitalism
thrives on the abundance of cheap available labour. To ensure availability,
the threat and reality of unemployed are used to control labour
costs and employee behaviour. A modest level of unemployment is
viewed by capitalists as beneficial (Piven and Cloward, 1971). On
the other hand, the unemployed, to supply perceived or real consumption
needs, turn to behaviour self-servingly defined by the capitalist
elites as criminal.
Under conflict/radical theory, this condition worsens during periods
of production and economic decline. During declines, the capitalist
need fewer cheap labourers, so the unemployed rolls lengthen. Control
of the lower classes is achieved no longer by threats of unemployment,
but through threats of sanctions by the criminal justice system.
Thus, it is hypothesized that as more individuals are unemployed,
more instrumental crimes are committed and more criminal behaviour
is detected and punished by the system.
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), in their “general theory of
crime” focus on underlying criminal propensity and absence
of self-control as primary causes of a preference for criminal behaviour
over conventional behaviour, which has far-reaching implications
for current and future legitimate employment. John Hagan (1993)
has referred to this propensity and the resulting isolation from
legitimate employment opportunities as “social embedded ness.”
He argues that an understanding of the process of embedded ness
is essential to the identification of critical interventions, such
as contacts with peers and the justice system. A similar perspective
has been presented by political scientist James Q. Wilson. Wilson
(1994) Attributes crime primarily to lack of self -control and absence
of regard for the well-being of others rather to absence of sufficient
incentives presented by legitimate employment or inadequate deterrence
incentives:
(H)igh-rate offenders have such poor impulse control that they are
neither very rational about how they spend their time nor very likely
to notice small shifts in the cost of committing a crime. This probably
helps explain why changes in the unemployment rate and the business
cycle have so weak a connection with the crime rate (Wilson, 1994:61).
Wilson goes on to attribute lack of self-control and absence of
compassion to poor familial habituation (Wilson, 1994:61-63).
The social-structural criminological and lack-of-self-control theories
differ fundamentally from those of economics, in ways that have
implications for both policy and analysis. Under the economic framework,
tastes are assumed as given, and increased opportunities in the
legitimate job market create incentives that should induce a reduction
in crime; crime can be reduced directly by improving economic conditions
to increase participation in legitimate activities, and by increasing
sanctions to deter participation in illegitimate activities. Under
each of the non-economic theories, the condition of unemployment
may alter tastes by reinforcing an inferior social status, inducing
criminal behaviour; unemployment is preceded by nature and nurture
forces that induce criminal behaviour as well, including biological,
prenatal and neurodevelopment, neuropsychological, neurological,
neurochemical, and psychological factors, as well as family, neighbourhood,
educational, religious, and other environmental factors.
2) The World Bank (2003). AWorld Bank Country Study. Caribbean Youth
Development Issues and Policy Directions. Washington DC.
As in other parts of the world, unemployment in the Caribbean is
primarily a youth phenomenon. Across countries in the Caribbean
and elsewhere, youth unemployment rates-that is the number of 15
to 24 year olds looking for work as a proportion of the sum of 15
to 24 year olds that are either working or looking for work are
double to quadruple the adult rates. International comparisons,
however, indicate that some Caribbean countries have particularly
high youth unemployment rates. According to the World development
indicators, from 1996 to 1998, St. Lucia had the highest rate in
the Americas and the Caribbean, followed by Jamaica. Caribbean wide
data indicates St. Lucia, followed by Dominica, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, and Jamaica have the highest youth unemployment
rates.
Within the Caribbean, Jamaica's homicide rates are the highest (35
homicides per 100,000) and levels for the Dominican Republic and
Trinidad and Tobago exceed the world average (11.7 and 12.6 homicides
per 100,000, respectively) (Ayres 1998). Violence also appears to
be mounting in the larger islands; for example, it increased six
fold in Trinidad and Tobago from the early 1980's to the early 1990s.
However, violent crimes tend to be geographically concentrated in
poor urban communities (Ayres 1998), with Kingston, Jamaica, reportedly
having one of the highest murder rates in the world.
3) Francis, A. et al. (2003). Crime and Development: The Jamaica
Experience. Faculty of Social Sciences University of the West Indies,
Mona.
Generally, unemployment rates have averaged about 15 percent of
the labour force annually over the last two decades, with rates
for females roughly twice those of males. Unemployment rates among
youths (14-19 years) have been high, with an annual average of almost
40 percent over the last two decades. This phenomenon has been identified
as contributing to high levels of uncertainty and vulnerability
among young people, leading to increase involvement in drug use
and crime.
Social stability is particularly dependent on the relationships
between the poor and non-poor in the society. In Jamaica, the Gini
coefficient is the most widely used index of inequality. During
the 1990s, the Gini coefficient has shown slightly downward trends
indicating marginal decreases in inequality across consumption groups.
However, in 2001, the gap between consumption shares in total national
consumption of the two poorest deciles and the two richest deciles
remains wide; the two poorest deciles accounted for 6.2 percent
of total national consumption, while the two richest deciles had
46 percent of total (JSLC, 2001).
Unemployment among young males 14 years to 24 years as measured
by the percentage unemployed of the labour force in this age group
is expected to motivate criminal offences. It is some significance
that violent crime, including the major crime of murder, is found
to be relatively more frequent among young males compared to other
age groups. Both the victims and the perpetrators tend to be disproportionately
biased towards young males. It is also noticeable that victims and
perpetrators tend to be unemployed or in the lowest occupational
stratum of the labour force as well. The theoretical argument that
a person will weigh the relative returns from legal and illegal
activities in contemplating behaviour for economic gain appears
to be even more forceful in the context of high and chronic unemployment
wherein legitimate opportunities for gain are virtually non-existent.
The trade off for a chronically unemployed person could be economic
benefit from engaging in an illegal activity versus no economic
benefit otherwise. It is arguable that a person who is unemployed
but expects that this is a temporary condition will not be motivated
to commit a crime for economic gain at the risk of acquiring a criminal
record (Pyle and Deadman 1997). At a societal level unemployment
can have opposing effects; while economic hardship from unemployment
might motivate crime, there is the opposite ‘opportunity effect’
which deters some types of crime (Beki 1999; Ellis 1991).4) Fadaei-Tehrani,
R. (1990). Crime, Unemployment and Poverty. National
University, San Diego. Mankind Quarterly; Vol. 31 Issue 1/2, p109,
18p.
In terms of the economic theory of opportunity costs ,crime is rational
behaviour, a choice that is made by a person or persons in deciding
how best to spend their time. In making the choice, individuals
consider the benefits and costs of using their time in different
ways; working legally, working illegally, or not working at all.
The tremendous and highly complex industrial development which went
on with ever-accelerating rapidity during the latter half of the
nineteenth century brought us face to face at the beginning of the
twentieth century with very serious social problems. The old laws
and customs seemed no longer sufficient to deal with these developments.
Generally, the infiltration of the social sciences into the law
and the administration of criminal justice began to take effect
during the first three decades of the twentieth century.
Tarde and Durkheim asserted that it was the profound changes in
social relations of society rather than in the economic system that
were responsible for the sudden transformation in what previously
were relatively constant crime rates. Edwin H. Sutherland’s
formulation of differential association “began to congeal
around the view that cultural conflict of complex social organization
resulting from social and economic changes involved in the industrialization
of the Western world had generated a pervasive industrialism and
other conditions conducive to criminality.”
Opportunity cost, which refers to what is forgone if a choice is
made to do one particular thing, is relevant as cost-benefit analysis
in the decision –making processes of criminals. The concept
of the opportunity cost has two main applications respecting criminal
behaviours. Some of the people who take up crime as a career calculate
that their prospective earnings will exceed the income they forgo
by not taking up legitimate employment. Another application has
to do with the probability of finding a job. If one is criminally
inclined, unemployed, and feels that the chances of getting a job
are small or nonexistent, the opportunity cost of turning to crime,
i.e., the forgone wages of legitimate employment, will seem minimal.
Such assessments may have contributed to the large increase in crimes
committed by young people. From 1960 to 1979, arrests for “serious”
and other crimes of those ages 18 or older doubled while arrests
of those under 18 quadrupled. The main infractions of those under
18 were against property rather than persons. Forty-four percent
of all arrests for burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft were
of youngsters under 18 years of age. One reason for the rise in
crimes committed by the young has simply been the huge increase,
absolute and relative, in their number. Another reason for the swelling
crime rate among the younger people was a large upswing in youth
unemployment and the associated reduction in the opportunity costs
of crime. As the young people perceived that relatively few jobs
were available they presumably reduced their estimates of the opportunity
costs of turning to crime. 5) Paternoster, R. & Bushway, S.
D. (2001). Theoretical and Empirical Work on the Relationship Between
Unemployment and Crime. Journal of Quantitati e Criminology, Vol.
17, No. 4.
Cantor and Land (1985, 1991; Land et al., 1995) argue that there
is a contemporaneous
negative relationship between unemployment and crime that is based
on routine activities theory. This argument hypothesizes that an
immediate consequence of unemployment is to reduce crime because
the unemployed generally find themselves in routine activities that
are more home-based. As a result of their unemployment, the argument
goes, those without jobs are less likely, at least in the short-term,
to be in public places where the risk of being victimized is greater
and are more likely to be guardians for their residences. In addition,
as an indicator of economic ‘‘bad times,’’
the immediate effect of unemployment is to reduce the ‘‘circulation
of people and property’’ (Cantor and Land, 1985, p.
320). Cantor and Land refer to these crime-reducing immediate consequences
of unemployment as the guardianship and system activity effect,
respectively.
Unemployment also has a positive effect on crime, however, by increasing
the criminal motivation of both unemployed and employed persons.
The unemployed are more highly motivated to commit crimes because
they are out of work and have financial needs. The employed are
also at greater risk of crime during periods of high unemployment
because they often are underemployed, have to remain in jobs they
are unsuited for or dissatisfied with, and often feel that they
will be the next to be laid off. Cantor and Land (1985) have termed
the positive effect of unemployment on crime for both the employed
and the unemployed the motivational effect. While the lion’s
share of the motivational effect is expected to be felt among the
unemployed, Cantor and Land are clear in arguing that since the
unemployment rate is a proxy for a poorly performing economy, it
is also believed to impact the employed.
They further argue that this motivational effect of unemployment
is not expected to be immediate but should be lagged by some time
period. This is because those recently made jobless have a stock
of resources (savings, unemployment, welfare) that they can immediately
draw upon and first must exhaust before feeling the financial ‘‘pinch’’
of unemployment. They have argued that the exact lag period to expect
is ambiguous, but is likely to be captured with a lag of 1 year.
Their justification for an expected 1 year lag is that the relevant
business cycle is short-term, with the repercussions of an economic
slump manifesting itself for only one or two years from its onset.
In other words, the motivational shift from conformer to offender
is gradual, becoming more acute as economic resources become depleted.
CRIME AND INEQUALITY
Source: 1) Robotham, D. (2002). Crime and Public
Policy in Jamaica. in
Understanding Crime in Jamaica New Challenges for Public Policy.
Harriott, A. (2003). University of the West Indies Press.
In 1997 the Gini coefficient reached 0.4164 – the highest
in the history of the Survey of Living Conditions (SLC). This exceeds
even the previous record of 0.3969 which was recorded during 1991,
the year of 80 percent inflation. The 1997 SLC also indicates that
the top 20 percent of the population accounted for about 49 percent
of all national consumption – an increase in its share. It
is clear that the bottom 70 percent of the population had lost ground
and in 1997 accounted for only 38.8 percent of all national consumption.
The SLC explicitly comments on this issue (STATIN 1997, 23).
The high interest rate regime maintained by the government as a
means of maintaining a fixed exchange rate has meant that, as was
pointed out earlier, Jamaica (like Brazil) is one of those developing
countries in which domestic debt far exceeds foreign debt. This
is because over the past eight years the formal economy has essentially
been financed by government high-interest-bearing securities, bought
by the wealthier strata of Jamaican society. Year after year, enormous
amounts in Jamaican dollars have had to be paid out from the government
budget of the holders of this government paper and , of course,
this money has come from general government revenues – in
other words, from taxation. Indeed, data indicate that in the absence
of this huge domestic debt, the Jamaican budget might well be in
surplus. However, when the large debt-servicing charges (mainly
domestic debt service) are factored in, the accounts go into a severe
deficit. There can be little doubt that the macroeconomic strategy
has been a very efficient income-redistribution machine, distributing
income upwards from the poorer and middle-class groups to the wealthier
strata.
The argument is often made that inequality per se does not cause
crime. This may be true when this factor is considered in the abstract
, and when it is not accompanied by extreme impoverishment on the
one side and substantial wealth on the other. It may also be true
for countries such Chile, Brazil or Mexico which possess an extremely
powerful military capacity to enforce inequalities and which do
not hesitate to demonstrate the effectiveness of this capacity from
time to time. Jamaica is not remotely in such a position and , fortunately,
is unlikely ever to be.
It is common to encounter stories of persons who have achieved great
material success by dishonest means but who are nonetheless treated
by official society as a pillar of the social order. The recent
financial crisis and the revelations of the serious financial difficulties
of politicians from across the political spectrum have greatly fuelled
this already strong held feeling. In this context the persistence
of an increase in inequality, accompanied by severe impoverishment
for the majority and a sense that the elite’s wealth represents
ill-gotten gain, is bound to breed extreme bitterness and deep resentment
among the deprived.
There is much qualitative evidence to suggest that there is a strong
feeling that Jamaica is not merely a society in which injustice
occur, but is an unjust society in the broadest sense of the term.
There is even evidence that this view is held by a majority of the
wealthy classes. By “injustice” here one is not referring
simply to failures of the judicial system to deliver swift and fair
justice. There is a broader sense of endemic unfairness which people
seem to have, one which encompasses economic practices, cultural
attitudes, and social and personal relationships, privileges and
networks. Although one cannot claim that this is a direct causal
factor in the high rates of violent crime in Jamaica, it nonetheless
creates an environment which at the least is tolerant of crime,
since the feeling seems to be that “everybody” does
it but only the weak get caught.
CRIME
AND POVERTY
Source: 1) Fadaei-Tehrani, R. (1990). Crime,
Unemployment and Poverty. National
University, San Diego. Mankind Quarterly; Vol. 31 Issue 1/2, p109,
18p.
However calculated, official crime rates are almost always higher
among the poor. Poor
people are more likely to be arrested and convicted for a wider
variety of offences. From the economists we obtain a utilitarian
perspective on how choices are made between alternative sources
of income, particularly those of employment and crime. In a sentence,
the models of economic choice theory, of which the criminal choice
is a special case, hypothesize that all individuals, criminals and
non-criminals alike, respond to incentives. In other words, the
decision to commit an illegal act is reached via an egocentric cost-benefit
analysis of both monetary and psychic elements. Individuals face
an ongoing set of choices between illegal and legal activities.
Individuals will participate in illegal activities if the anticipated
returns from those illegal actions exceed the anticipated returns
from those illegal actions exceed the anticipated returns from legal
actions. Based on the opportunities, Heineke (1978) distinguishes
two general classes of models. Portfolio models address what portion
of a decision maker’s wealth is risked in criminal activity
and, therefore, requires that all returns from illegal activity
be expressed in monetary equivalents.
CRIME
IN BARBADOS AND JAMAICA
Source: 1) King, J. W. (1997). Paradise lost?
Crime in the Caribbean: A Comparison of Barbados and Jamaica. Caribbean
Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, 2(1) 30-44. Psychological
Research Centre, UWI, St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad.
Barbados and Jamaica are both former British colonies, each gaining
political independence about the same time (in 1966 and 1962 respectively).
Both island nations have been built on a history of slavery, colonialism
and the plantation system. Under British rule beginning in the mid-1600’s,
slaves were brought from West Africa to toil in the sugarcane fields
under white British rule. These islands developed a monocrop economy
creating a wealthy and prosperous plantocaracy that possessed both
economic and political power. Even after emancipation in 1938, many
black slaves continued to work the plantations because few opportunities
existed to own and cultivate land. Other freed slaves migrated to
neighbouring islands in search of a better life.
Today Barbados and Jamaica along with other Caribbean nations are
struggling along a difficult path of economic development. Both
economies are heavily dependent on tourism and agricultural products
– two sources of revenue that are delicately balanced against
the dangers of hurricanes and the vagaries of the travelling public.
Additionally, Barbados has attracted foreign business and investment
in data processing operations and Jamaica has enjoyed investment
in data processing operations and Jamaica has enjoyed profits from
natural resources, notably bauxite and alumina. Other Caribbean
countries have developed off-shore textile operations creating many
needed jobs in this less-developed region.
While Jamaica and Barbados share a history of slavery, British colonial
rule, and an economy built of the plantation system, they are each
unique with respect to their present-day status among Caribbean
nations. Barbadians or “bajans” as they are called enjoy
a much higher standard of living compared with Jamaicans. In 1994,
the per capita GNP in Jamaica was $US 1,420 and $US 6,530 in Barbados.
Various socio-demographic and economic indicators suggest that the
quality of life and range of opportunities is higher in Barbados
than in Jamaica. In fact, Jamaica more clearly fits the label “third
world” country than Barbados. Jamaica is a heavily indebted
country with a higher inflation rate (52% in 1992) and a weak currency
(one US dollar equals about 35 Jamaican dollars).
Economic Inequality
There is fundamental agreement that economic inequality is associated
with crime. Headley (1996), argues that “a patter of dependent
capitalist relations in Jamaica has served to produce a situation
in which the scarcity of regular, socially acceptable work has condemned
a substantial portion of the Jamaican population to an economically
marginal existence.” He argues on to suggest that “persistent
poverty, structural unemployment and rural dispossession have given
rise to acts of scuffling, petty hustling, street crime (often experience
by extreme violence) and creation of an international drugs-and-guns
network peopled by segments of a displaced working class who have
historically found economic relief by migrating” (Headley,
1996:39).
Although Headley is referring specifically to Jamaica, Barbados
also experiences conditions of economic inequality with an unemployment
rate of 21.9% in 1994. Actually, it is relative deprivation rather
than absolute poverty that appears to be the key instigator behind
crime and violence. In countries with significant numbers of affluent
tourists arriving each year, the rather modest living conditions
experienced by the average Caribbean resident becomes even more
obvious. It is not surprising that a sense of frustration accompanied
by high levels of property and violent crimes appears throughout
the Caribbean.
Modernisation and crime
A full understanding of Caribbean culture requires an examination
of the recent influences of North American mass media and tourism.
There is presently great concern among Caribbean scholars and policy
makers that the massive invasion of North American television programming
is erasing any remnants of indigenous culture throughout the Caribbean.
A report commissioned by the Caribbean Publishing and Broadcasting
Association states that “The Caribbean is exposed to a level
of foreign content in books, magazines, radio and television. As
a source, of news, information and entertainment, television can
have far reaching effects on Caribbean culture and politics. Foreign
content in the region’s programming has reached a level that
is unacceptable” (Hetsberger, 1995). In fact, over 80 percent
of Caribbean electronic media content is foreign produced! Of all
sub-regions of the world, the Caribbean is the most penetrated in
terms of foreign television programming (Hetsberger, 1995).
Aside from the issues of the loss of indigenous culture, there is
the very real possibility that increasing Americanisation of the
Caribbean region has brought with it negative influences associated
with rising levels of crime and delinquency. Recent analyses of
rising levels of delinquency in China has concluded that increasing
Western influence has created the rapid introduction of new ideas,
values and attitudes disrupting the traditional mechanisms of social
control. The results of a dramatic increase in youth crime (Rojeck,
1988). Caribbean commentators have cited “foreign penetration”
as a correlate of criminogenic images and attitudes. It is the combination
of these images along with the presence of other criminogenic factors
that gave rise to growing criminality. Thus, disenfranchised urban
youth who seek power, status and excitement act on their impulses
as do the protagonists in many of the American movies and television
programmes so common throughout the Caribbean.
One commentator states “Our acculturation process has been
subverted by the U.S. Propaganda apparatus operating through the
cinema and television which spews forth a continuous diet of violence
which has been accepted almost unquestionably as suitable for Jamaica
as it pursues modernization” (Bonnick, 1994:157). A “bad
guy” image has been embraced by many Jamaican youth residing
in Kingston’s ghettos. Many youth join gangs and pursue a
thrill-seeking lifestyle where violence is condoned and even celebrated.
In the discussion thus far, it has become evident that Barbados
and Jamaica are very different with respect to serious crimes and
delinquency. While both countries have experienced increasing levels
of crime, Jamaica clearly contends with some special criminogenic
conditions that are either absent or less evident in Barbados. Part
of this is tied to the recent social and political history of Jamaica.
It is this recent history that provides a glimpse into how Jamaica
became so violent and the conditions that continue to fan the flames
of violence.
Jamaica has a history of political violence. It is important to
note that up until the 1960’s the levels of crime in Jamaica
were similar to the Eastern Caribbean (where Barbados is located).
Starting in the 1960’s and into the 1970’s there developed
a new political consciousness borne out of poverty, powerlessness
and partisan politics.
Carl Stone (1988:24) suggests that this political consciousness
“was rooted in a period when racial militancy became part
of political consciousness of urban ghetto youth and crime was seen
(in its initial beginnings) as a political act and as an act of
protest against an unjust social order.” Later the violence
became more organized linked to gangs supported by the two main
political parties – The Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) and the
People’s National Party (PNP). No longer was this “lumpen”
violence a collective response to the conditions of abject deprivation,
but rather a means for each political party to maintain power by
supplying gangs with weapons and using intimidation tactics during
elections to establish dominance and control.
The result was the emergence of “garrison constituencies”
in Kingston neighbourhoods. A patronage system insured that all
the players got what they wanted – politicians received support
in elections, local “Thugs” who insured the votes received
favours such as work contracts and police protection and drug traffickers
were provided with guns to conduct their business. In the 1970’s
and into the 1980’s election related violence was especially
pronounced. Of the 800-odd murders reported for the island in 1980,
most were attributed to political violence between the island’s
two warring political “tribes” (Headley, 1996). From
a criminological standpoint, the evidence points to a subculture
of violence that reached such epidemic proportions that even the
police were powerless in their control efforts. In1974 the threat
became substantial enough that the PNP government under Michael
Manley passed a repressive Suppression of Crime Act and created
along with it a special “Gun Court” that would hear
criminal cases involving guns and mete out severe penalties. In
the past ten years Jamaica has seen a significant reduction in election
related violence, however, the political divisions remain as do
the issues of most concern to the majority of Jamaicans.
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