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(l-r) Rapporteur, Tres-Ann Cooke and Group Leader Dr. Anthony Harriott in discussion

Is Jamaica’s crime-rate exceptional?
What has been its impact on economic performance?

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CRIME AND THE ECONOMY
CRIME IN BARBADOS AND JAMAICA
 
GROUP LEADER

Dr. Anthony Harriott, Senior Lecturer, Comparative Politics, Department of Government, UWI, Mona Campus

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RAPPORTEUR

Ms. Tres-Ann Cooke, Ph.D. Candidate, Criminology, University of Kent at Canterbury, United Kingdom

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CRIME AND UNEMPLOYMENT


Source: 1) Forst, B. & Bennett, R. R. (1998). Unemployment and Crime:
Implications for the Caribbean. Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, 3(1/2), 1-29. Psychological Research Centre, UWI, St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad.


The Caribbean region has experienced dramatic increases in crime since 1977 (Bennett and Lynch, 1996; DeAlbuquerque, 1995). Thus increase is partially attributable to the growth in the drug trafficking corridor from South America and the United States. The attractiveness of participating in drug-related crimes may well be related to the availability of legitimate employment opportunities in the region.

Theoretical perspective
Strain theory, posits that crime is a product of a discrepancy between the culturally held goals of society and the socially approved means by which to attain them. According to Merton (1968), the goals of society are held consensually. However, the means of those goals are unevenly distributed within society, and lower status persons are especially unlikely to enjoy them. For Merton, as well as Cloward and Ohlin (1960), these means refer to legitimate employment and employment opportunities. Any restriction in access to legitimate opportunity is hypothesized to generate adaptive behaviours, the majority being criminal. Strain theory suggests that these behaviours are less likely to lead to participation in legitimate activity - hence, more crime and less employment - in lower status than in higher status environments.


Conflict/radical framework, which posits that the law is an instrument used by the wealthy to dominate and exploit the underclass and to preserve class distinctions (Quinney, 1970, 1977; Turk, 1969; Huff, 1980). In the conflict/radical perspective, unemployment is related to crime, especially property crime, in a circuitous fashion. Capitalism thrives on the abundance of cheap available labour. To ensure availability, the threat and reality of unemployed are used to control labour costs and employee behaviour. A modest level of unemployment is viewed by capitalists as beneficial (Piven and Cloward, 1971). On the other hand, the unemployed, to supply perceived or real consumption needs, turn to behaviour self-servingly defined by the capitalist elites as criminal.

Under conflict/radical theory, this condition worsens during periods of production and economic decline. During declines, the capitalist need fewer cheap labourers, so the unemployed rolls lengthen. Control of the lower classes is achieved no longer by threats of unemployment, but through threats of sanctions by the criminal justice system. Thus, it is hypothesized that as more individuals are unemployed, more instrumental crimes are committed and more criminal behaviour is detected and punished by the system.

Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), in their “general theory of crime” focus on underlying criminal propensity and absence of self-control as primary causes of a preference for criminal behaviour over conventional behaviour, which has far-reaching implications for current and future legitimate employment. John Hagan (1993) has referred to this propensity and the resulting isolation from legitimate employment opportunities as “social embedded ness.” He argues that an understanding of the process of embedded ness is essential to the identification of critical interventions, such as contacts with peers and the justice system. A similar perspective has been presented by political scientist James Q. Wilson. Wilson (1994) Attributes crime primarily to lack of self -control and absence of regard for the well-being of others rather to absence of sufficient incentives presented by legitimate employment or inadequate deterrence incentives:
(H)igh-rate offenders have such poor impulse control that they are neither very rational about how they spend their time nor very likely to notice small shifts in the cost of committing a crime. This probably helps explain why changes in the unemployment rate and the business cycle have so weak a connection with the crime rate (Wilson, 1994:61).
Wilson goes on to attribute lack of self-control and absence of compassion to poor familial habituation (Wilson, 1994:61-63).

The social-structural criminological and lack-of-self-control theories differ fundamentally from those of economics, in ways that have implications for both policy and analysis. Under the economic framework, tastes are assumed as given, and increased opportunities in the legitimate job market create incentives that should induce a reduction in crime; crime can be reduced directly by improving economic conditions to increase participation in legitimate activities, and by increasing sanctions to deter participation in illegitimate activities. Under each of the non-economic theories, the condition of unemployment may alter tastes by reinforcing an inferior social status, inducing criminal behaviour; unemployment is preceded by nature and nurture forces that induce criminal behaviour as well, including biological, prenatal and neurodevelopment, neuropsychological, neurological, neurochemical, and psychological factors, as well as family, neighbourhood, educational, religious, and other environmental factors.
2) The World Bank (2003). AWorld Bank Country Study. Caribbean Youth Development Issues and Policy Directions. Washington DC.

As in other parts of the world, unemployment in the Caribbean is primarily a youth phenomenon. Across countries in the Caribbean and elsewhere, youth unemployment rates-that is the number of 15 to 24 year olds looking for work as a proportion of the sum of 15 to 24 year olds that are either working or looking for work are double to quadruple the adult rates. International comparisons, however, indicate that some Caribbean countries have particularly high youth unemployment rates. According to the World development indicators, from 1996 to 1998, St. Lucia had the highest rate in the Americas and the Caribbean, followed by Jamaica. Caribbean wide data indicates St. Lucia, followed by Dominica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Jamaica have the highest youth unemployment rates.

Within the Caribbean, Jamaica's homicide rates are the highest (35 homicides per 100,000) and levels for the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago exceed the world average (11.7 and 12.6 homicides per 100,000, respectively) (Ayres 1998). Violence also appears to be mounting in the larger islands; for example, it increased six fold in Trinidad and Tobago from the early 1980's to the early 1990s. However, violent crimes tend to be geographically concentrated in poor urban communities (Ayres 1998), with Kingston, Jamaica, reportedly having one of the highest murder rates in the world.

3) Francis, A. et al. (2003). Crime and Development: The Jamaica Experience. Faculty of Social Sciences University of the West Indies, Mona.

Generally, unemployment rates have averaged about 15 percent of the labour force annually over the last two decades, with rates for females roughly twice those of males. Unemployment rates among youths (14-19 years) have been high, with an annual average of almost 40 percent over the last two decades. This phenomenon has been identified as contributing to high levels of uncertainty and vulnerability among young people, leading to increase involvement in drug use and crime.

Social stability is particularly dependent on the relationships between the poor and non-poor in the society. In Jamaica, the Gini coefficient is the most widely used index of inequality. During the 1990s, the Gini coefficient has shown slightly downward trends indicating marginal decreases in inequality across consumption groups. However, in 2001, the gap between consumption shares in total national consumption of the two poorest deciles and the two richest deciles remains wide; the two poorest deciles accounted for 6.2 percent of total national consumption, while the two richest deciles had 46 percent of total (JSLC, 2001).

Unemployment among young males 14 years to 24 years as measured by the percentage unemployed of the labour force in this age group is expected to motivate criminal offences. It is some significance that violent crime, including the major crime of murder, is found to be relatively more frequent among young males compared to other age groups. Both the victims and the perpetrators tend to be disproportionately biased towards young males. It is also noticeable that victims and perpetrators tend to be unemployed or in the lowest occupational stratum of the labour force as well. The theoretical argument that a person will weigh the relative returns from legal and illegal activities in contemplating behaviour for economic gain appears to be even more forceful in the context of high and chronic unemployment wherein legitimate opportunities for gain are virtually non-existent. The trade off for a chronically unemployed person could be economic benefit from engaging in an illegal activity versus no economic benefit otherwise. It is arguable that a person who is unemployed but expects that this is a temporary condition will not be motivated to commit a crime for economic gain at the risk of acquiring a criminal record (Pyle and Deadman 1997). At a societal level unemployment can have opposing effects; while economic hardship from unemployment might motivate crime, there is the opposite ‘opportunity effect’ which deters some types of crime (Beki 1999; Ellis 1991).4) Fadaei-Tehrani, R. (1990). Crime, Unemployment and Poverty. National
University, San Diego. Mankind Quarterly; Vol. 31 Issue 1/2, p109, 18p.

In terms of the economic theory of opportunity costs ,crime is rational behaviour, a choice that is made by a person or persons in deciding how best to spend their time. In making the choice, individuals consider the benefits and costs of using their time in different ways; working legally, working illegally, or not working at all.

The tremendous and highly complex industrial development which went on with ever-accelerating rapidity during the latter half of the nineteenth century brought us face to face at the beginning of the twentieth century with very serious social problems. The old laws and customs seemed no longer sufficient to deal with these developments. Generally, the infiltration of the social sciences into the law and the administration of criminal justice began to take effect during the first three decades of the twentieth century.

Tarde and Durkheim asserted that it was the profound changes in social relations of society rather than in the economic system that were responsible for the sudden transformation in what previously were relatively constant crime rates. Edwin H. Sutherland’s formulation of differential association “began to congeal around the view that cultural conflict of complex social organization resulting from social and economic changes involved in the industrialization of the Western world had generated a pervasive industrialism and other conditions conducive to criminality.”

Opportunity cost, which refers to what is forgone if a choice is made to do one particular thing, is relevant as cost-benefit analysis in the decision –making processes of criminals. The concept of the opportunity cost has two main applications respecting criminal behaviours. Some of the people who take up crime as a career calculate that their prospective earnings will exceed the income they forgo by not taking up legitimate employment. Another application has to do with the probability of finding a job. If one is criminally inclined, unemployed, and feels that the chances of getting a job are small or nonexistent, the opportunity cost of turning to crime, i.e., the forgone wages of legitimate employment, will seem minimal. Such assessments may have contributed to the large increase in crimes committed by young people. From 1960 to 1979, arrests for “serious” and other crimes of those ages 18 or older doubled while arrests of those under 18 quadrupled. The main infractions of those under 18 were against property rather than persons. Forty-four percent of all arrests for burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft were of youngsters under 18 years of age. One reason for the rise in crimes committed by the young has simply been the huge increase, absolute and relative, in their number. Another reason for the swelling crime rate among the younger people was a large upswing in youth unemployment and the associated reduction in the opportunity costs of crime. As the young people perceived that relatively few jobs were available they presumably reduced their estimates of the opportunity costs of turning to crime. 5) Paternoster, R. & Bushway, S. D. (2001). Theoretical and Empirical Work on the Relationship Between Unemployment and Crime. Journal of Quantitati e Criminology, Vol. 17, No. 4.

Cantor and Land (1985, 1991; Land et al., 1995) argue that there is a contemporaneous
negative relationship between unemployment and crime that is based on routine activities theory. This argument hypothesizes that an immediate consequence of unemployment is to reduce crime because the unemployed generally find themselves in routine activities that are more home-based. As a result of their unemployment, the argument goes, those without jobs are less likely, at least in the short-term, to be in public places where the risk of being victimized is greater and are more likely to be guardians for their residences. In addition, as an indicator of economic ‘‘bad times,’’ the immediate effect of unemployment is to reduce the ‘‘circulation of people and property’’ (Cantor and Land, 1985, p. 320). Cantor and Land refer to these crime-reducing immediate consequences of unemployment as the guardianship and system activity effect, respectively.

Unemployment also has a positive effect on crime, however, by increasing the criminal motivation of both unemployed and employed persons. The unemployed are more highly motivated to commit crimes because they are out of work and have financial needs. The employed are also at greater risk of crime during periods of high unemployment because they often are underemployed, have to remain in jobs they are unsuited for or dissatisfied with, and often feel that they will be the next to be laid off. Cantor and Land (1985) have termed the positive effect of unemployment on crime for both the employed and the unemployed the motivational effect. While the lion’s share of the motivational effect is expected to be felt among the unemployed, Cantor and Land are clear in arguing that since the unemployment rate is a proxy for a poorly performing economy, it is also believed to impact the employed.

They further argue that this motivational effect of unemployment is not expected to be immediate but should be lagged by some time period. This is because those recently made jobless have a stock of resources (savings, unemployment, welfare) that they can immediately draw upon and first must exhaust before feeling the financial ‘‘pinch’’ of unemployment. They have argued that the exact lag period to expect is ambiguous, but is likely to be captured with a lag of 1 year. Their justification for an expected 1 year lag is that the relevant business cycle is short-term, with the repercussions of an economic slump manifesting itself for only one or two years from its onset. In other words, the motivational shift from conformer to offender is gradual, becoming more acute as economic resources become depleted.



CRIME AND INEQUALITY

Source: 1) Robotham, D. (2002). Crime and Public Policy in Jamaica. in
Understanding Crime in Jamaica New Challenges for Public Policy. Harriott, A. (2003). University of the West Indies Press.

In 1997 the Gini coefficient reached 0.4164 – the highest in the history of the Survey of Living Conditions (SLC). This exceeds even the previous record of 0.3969 which was recorded during 1991, the year of 80 percent inflation. The 1997 SLC also indicates that the top 20 percent of the population accounted for about 49 percent of all national consumption – an increase in its share. It is clear that the bottom 70 percent of the population had lost ground and in 1997 accounted for only 38.8 percent of all national consumption. The SLC explicitly comments on this issue (STATIN 1997, 23).

The high interest rate regime maintained by the government as a means of maintaining a fixed exchange rate has meant that, as was pointed out earlier, Jamaica (like Brazil) is one of those developing countries in which domestic debt far exceeds foreign debt. This is because over the past eight years the formal economy has essentially been financed by government high-interest-bearing securities, bought by the wealthier strata of Jamaican society. Year after year, enormous amounts in Jamaican dollars have had to be paid out from the government budget of the holders of this government paper and , of course, this money has come from general government revenues – in other words, from taxation. Indeed, data indicate that in the absence of this huge domestic debt, the Jamaican budget might well be in surplus. However, when the large debt-servicing charges (mainly domestic debt service) are factored in, the accounts go into a severe deficit. There can be little doubt that the macroeconomic strategy has been a very efficient income-redistribution machine, distributing income upwards from the poorer and middle-class groups to the wealthier strata.

The argument is often made that inequality per se does not cause crime. This may be true when this factor is considered in the abstract , and when it is not accompanied by extreme impoverishment on the one side and substantial wealth on the other. It may also be true for countries such Chile, Brazil or Mexico which possess an extremely powerful military capacity to enforce inequalities and which do not hesitate to demonstrate the effectiveness of this capacity from time to time. Jamaica is not remotely in such a position and , fortunately, is unlikely ever to be.

It is common to encounter stories of persons who have achieved great material success by dishonest means but who are nonetheless treated by official society as a pillar of the social order. The recent financial crisis and the revelations of the serious financial difficulties of politicians from across the political spectrum have greatly fuelled this already strong held feeling. In this context the persistence of an increase in inequality, accompanied by severe impoverishment for the majority and a sense that the elite’s wealth represents ill-gotten gain, is bound to breed extreme bitterness and deep resentment among the deprived.

There is much qualitative evidence to suggest that there is a strong feeling that Jamaica is not merely a society in which injustice occur, but is an unjust society in the broadest sense of the term. There is even evidence that this view is held by a majority of the wealthy classes. By “injustice” here one is not referring simply to failures of the judicial system to deliver swift and fair justice. There is a broader sense of endemic unfairness which people seem to have, one which encompasses economic practices, cultural attitudes, and social and personal relationships, privileges and networks. Although one cannot claim that this is a direct causal factor in the high rates of violent crime in Jamaica, it nonetheless creates an environment which at the least is tolerant of crime, since the feeling seems to be that “everybody” does it but only the weak get caught.



CRIME AND POVERTY

Source: 1) Fadaei-Tehrani, R. (1990). Crime, Unemployment and Poverty. National
University, San Diego. Mankind Quarterly; Vol. 31 Issue 1/2, p109, 18p.


However calculated, official crime rates are almost always higher among the poor. Poor
people are more likely to be arrested and convicted for a wider variety of offences. From the economists we obtain a utilitarian perspective on how choices are made between alternative sources of income, particularly those of employment and crime. In a sentence, the models of economic choice theory, of which the criminal choice is a special case, hypothesize that all individuals, criminals and non-criminals alike, respond to incentives. In other words, the decision to commit an illegal act is reached via an egocentric cost-benefit analysis of both monetary and psychic elements. Individuals face an ongoing set of choices between illegal and legal activities. Individuals will participate in illegal activities if the anticipated returns from those illegal actions exceed the anticipated returns from those illegal actions exceed the anticipated returns from legal actions. Based on the opportunities, Heineke (1978) distinguishes two general classes of models. Portfolio models address what portion of a decision maker’s wealth is risked in criminal activity and, therefore, requires that all returns from illegal activity be expressed in monetary equivalents.

CRIME IN BARBADOS AND JAMAICA


Source: 1) King, J. W. (1997). Paradise lost? Crime in the Caribbean: A Comparison of Barbados and Jamaica. Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, 2(1) 30-44. Psychological Research Centre, UWI, St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad.

Barbados and Jamaica are both former British colonies, each gaining political independence about the same time (in 1966 and 1962 respectively). Both island nations have been built on a history of slavery, colonialism and the plantation system. Under British rule beginning in the mid-1600’s, slaves were brought from West Africa to toil in the sugarcane fields under white British rule. These islands developed a monocrop economy creating a wealthy and prosperous plantocaracy that possessed both economic and political power. Even after emancipation in 1938, many black slaves continued to work the plantations because few opportunities existed to own and cultivate land. Other freed slaves migrated to neighbouring islands in search of a better life.

Today Barbados and Jamaica along with other Caribbean nations are struggling along a difficult path of economic development. Both economies are heavily dependent on tourism and agricultural products – two sources of revenue that are delicately balanced against the dangers of hurricanes and the vagaries of the travelling public. Additionally, Barbados has attracted foreign business and investment in data processing operations and Jamaica has enjoyed investment in data processing operations and Jamaica has enjoyed profits from natural resources, notably bauxite and alumina. Other Caribbean countries have developed off-shore textile operations creating many needed jobs in this less-developed region.
While Jamaica and Barbados share a history of slavery, British colonial rule, and an economy built of the plantation system, they are each unique with respect to their present-day status among Caribbean nations. Barbadians or “bajans” as they are called enjoy a much higher standard of living compared with Jamaicans. In 1994, the per capita GNP in Jamaica was $US 1,420 and $US 6,530 in Barbados. Various socio-demographic and economic indicators suggest that the quality of life and range of opportunities is higher in Barbados than in Jamaica. In fact, Jamaica more clearly fits the label “third world” country than Barbados. Jamaica is a heavily indebted country with a higher inflation rate (52% in 1992) and a weak currency (one US dollar equals about 35 Jamaican dollars).

Economic Inequality

There is fundamental agreement that economic inequality is associated with crime. Headley (1996), argues that “a patter of dependent capitalist relations in Jamaica has served to produce a situation in which the scarcity of regular, socially acceptable work has condemned a substantial portion of the Jamaican population to an economically marginal existence.” He argues on to suggest that “persistent poverty, structural unemployment and rural dispossession have given rise to acts of scuffling, petty hustling, street crime (often experience by extreme violence) and creation of an international drugs-and-guns network peopled by segments of a displaced working class who have historically found economic relief by migrating” (Headley, 1996:39).

Although Headley is referring specifically to Jamaica, Barbados also experiences conditions of economic inequality with an unemployment rate of 21.9% in 1994. Actually, it is relative deprivation rather than absolute poverty that appears to be the key instigator behind crime and violence. In countries with significant numbers of affluent tourists arriving each year, the rather modest living conditions experienced by the average Caribbean resident becomes even more obvious. It is not surprising that a sense of frustration accompanied by high levels of property and violent crimes appears throughout the Caribbean.

Modernisation and crime
A full understanding of Caribbean culture requires an examination of the recent influences of North American mass media and tourism. There is presently great concern among Caribbean scholars and policy makers that the massive invasion of North American television programming is erasing any remnants of indigenous culture throughout the Caribbean.

A report commissioned by the Caribbean Publishing and Broadcasting Association states that “The Caribbean is exposed to a level of foreign content in books, magazines, radio and television. As a source, of news, information and entertainment, television can have far reaching effects on Caribbean culture and politics. Foreign content in the region’s programming has reached a level that is unacceptable” (Hetsberger, 1995). In fact, over 80 percent of Caribbean electronic media content is foreign produced! Of all sub-regions of the world, the Caribbean is the most penetrated in terms of foreign television programming (Hetsberger, 1995).

Aside from the issues of the loss of indigenous culture, there is the very real possibility that increasing Americanisation of the Caribbean region has brought with it negative influences associated with rising levels of crime and delinquency. Recent analyses of rising levels of delinquency in China has concluded that increasing Western influence has created the rapid introduction of new ideas, values and attitudes disrupting the traditional mechanisms of social control. The results of a dramatic increase in youth crime (Rojeck, 1988). Caribbean commentators have cited “foreign penetration” as a correlate of criminogenic images and attitudes. It is the combination of these images along with the presence of other criminogenic factors that gave rise to growing criminality. Thus, disenfranchised urban youth who seek power, status and excitement act on their impulses as do the protagonists in many of the American movies and television programmes so common throughout the Caribbean.
One commentator states “Our acculturation process has been subverted by the U.S. Propaganda apparatus operating through the cinema and television which spews forth a continuous diet of violence which has been accepted almost unquestionably as suitable for Jamaica as it pursues modernization” (Bonnick, 1994:157). A “bad guy” image has been embraced by many Jamaican youth residing in Kingston’s ghettos. Many youth join gangs and pursue a thrill-seeking lifestyle where violence is condoned and even celebrated.

In the discussion thus far, it has become evident that Barbados and Jamaica are very different with respect to serious crimes and delinquency. While both countries have experienced increasing levels of crime, Jamaica clearly contends with some special criminogenic conditions that are either absent or less evident in Barbados. Part of this is tied to the recent social and political history of Jamaica. It is this recent history that provides a glimpse into how Jamaica became so violent and the conditions that continue to fan the flames of violence.

Jamaica has a history of political violence. It is important to note that up until the 1960’s the levels of crime in Jamaica were similar to the Eastern Caribbean (where Barbados is located). Starting in the 1960’s and into the 1970’s there developed a new political consciousness borne out of poverty, powerlessness and partisan politics.

Carl Stone (1988:24) suggests that this political consciousness “was rooted in a period when racial militancy became part of political consciousness of urban ghetto youth and crime was seen (in its initial beginnings) as a political act and as an act of protest against an unjust social order.” Later the violence became more organized linked to gangs supported by the two main political parties – The Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP). No longer was this “lumpen” violence a collective response to the conditions of abject deprivation, but rather a means for each political party to maintain power by supplying gangs with weapons and using intimidation tactics during elections to establish dominance and control.

The result was the emergence of “garrison constituencies” in Kingston neighbourhoods. A patronage system insured that all the players got what they wanted – politicians received support in elections, local “Thugs” who insured the votes received favours such as work contracts and police protection and drug traffickers were provided with guns to conduct their business. In the 1970’s and into the 1980’s election related violence was especially pronounced. Of the 800-odd murders reported for the island in 1980, most were attributed to political violence between the island’s two warring political “tribes” (Headley, 1996). From a criminological standpoint, the evidence points to a subculture of violence that reached such epidemic proportions that even the police were powerless in their control efforts. In1974 the threat became substantial enough that the PNP government under Michael Manley passed a repressive Suppression of Crime Act and created along with it a special “Gun Court” that would hear criminal cases involving guns and mete out severe penalties. In the past ten years Jamaica has seen a significant reduction in election related violence, however, the political divisions remain as do the issues of most concern to the majority of Jamaicans.

 

 

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