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| (l-r) Rapporteur
Myra Colding and Group Leader Diana Thorburn |
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How
did the external economic and political environment affect Jamaica’s
post-independence economic development? |
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Download Research to date |
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First
Working Document Prepared by Nadiya Figueroa
Purpose of this document:
• To provide the basis to arrive at a common understanding of
the trajectory of Jamaica’s intellectual, ideological and policy
approaches to its external environment, since its Independence, with
a particular focus on the implications for the domestic economy
Objectives of this meeting:
• To modify and/or add to this document where group members’
expertise allows
• Having arrived at an agreed on narrative of the trajectory
as stated above, to come to an agreement on the priority areas for
further investigation and research to answer the question as set out
above
• To identify actual resources to assist in the investigation
and researchPeriod A: 1962-1972
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GROUP
LEADER |
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Dr. Diana Thorburn,
Lecturer, International Relations, Department of Government,
UWI, Mona Campus
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RAPPORTEUR |
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Ms.
Myra Colding,
Teaching Assistant, Department of Government, UWI, Mona Campus
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| We’re
with the West – Seeking Entry into the World System
Context
Jamaica gained its independence from Great Britain in 1962, making
it the first English-speaking island of the Caribbean to do so.
Anthony Payne recalls the observation made by Samuel Huntington
that after three hundred years of colonialism, British rule had
very effectively entrenched the institutions and standards of the
mother country into the fabric of the island. With the cutting of
colonial ties and the realization of independence came the responsibility
of managing one’s own international affairs. From 1962 onwards
the Jamaican government was charged with the task of charting the
island’s foreign policy, but the legacy of colonialism and
the historical linkage to the west would play a determining role
for some time to come.
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In the first decade of independence the strong allegiance of Jamaica
to the west was well exhibited, although the conceptualization of
a western center and the focal point of allegiance did shift. According
to Randolph Persaud there was a significant, “shift of center
of economic gravity and military power from Great Britain to the United
States” leading up to and immediately following independence.
Persaud cites evidence from the trade and investment patterns of the
island to back up this claim. During this period the world economy
was experiencing a post-war boom, due in part to rapid transformations
in industrialization taking place in the United States. Jamaica would
have been experiencing a pull, economic and otherwise, to the North
Atlantic region or the “west” – and perhaps most
of all to the steadily growing great industrial power, the United
States.
Within Jamaica theories of modernization and Arthur Lewis’s
more specific small island approach to industrialization, through
import-substitution and export-orientation, were taking hold. Diversification
of industry in a movement away from sugar monoculture was being heralded
as the route to development. Jamaica moved into manufacturing and
services through bauxite and tourism, the two chosen engines of growth.
The approach was generally successful and Jamaica achieved an average
annual growth rate of 5% per annum throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
In this era of economic progress “high hopes” were also
entertained with respect to the role of the United Nations and the
ability of the international community of nations to establish a world
order based on “the maintenance of peace and stability and on
international cooperation.” Jamaica stepped on to the world
stage at a time when multilateralism was well regarded as a means
through which nations related to one another, in this environment
collectively held principles such as those of sovereignty and equality
were thought of as key to the survival of small states such as Jamaica.
Ideology – Persaud quotes Obika Grey as characterizing
the operating ideology of Jamaican foreign policy in the 1960s, under
the leadership of the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and the first Prime
Minister, Sir Alexander Bustamante, as exceptionalism. Persaud asserts
that the JLP took pride in arguing that Jamaica was an “atypical”
Third World developing country, different and apart from other countries
at a similar stage of independence. The government substantiated this
argument by emphasizing the country’s lack of racial or ethnic
conflict, its stable democratic system and relatively well-developed
infrastructure. Jamaica was thus supposedly exceptional in its readiness
for industrial take-off and accelerated development. The concern here
would have been to project a positive image to the potential investors
of the western world. This preoccupation with aligning the image of
Jamaica with what was deemed desirable by the western powers was not
limited to the leadership. Professors Wendell Bell and J. William
Gibson found in their studies of the elite of Jamaica in 1962, that
a “substantial majority” stated a preference for Jamaica’s
alignment with the western nations. This initial approach to foreign
policy has been deemed by some as “cautious” and “conservative”
and in retrospect has been dubbed as the years during which Jamaica
was unequivocally “with the west”.
International Economic Relations – On gaining
independence Jamaica wholeheartedly accepted the Bretton Woods international
financial system. The rhetoric of exceptionalism served the government
well in its campaign to secure funding for the development of young
Jamaica. According to Persaud the JLP government made it known that
it was not interested in “traditional aid”, but instead
was seeking foreign investment. If aid was granted the government
preferred if it was done so on a basis different from that of other
Third World developing countries. Addresses made on behalf of the
government at international fora such as the United Nations alluded
to this position. In Persaud’s evaluation the government “wanted
net capital transfers without the stigma of being a foreign aid recipient.”
The government made it a foreign policy priority to secure foreign
capital, and as such, energy and resources were put towards this task.
Looking to the government’s Five Year Plan launched at independence,
Persaud highlights the emphasis that was placed on securing foreign
capital – of the 5.6million pounds put toward the Industrial
Development Cooperation, 200,000 went into small businesses, only
25,000 went into training, despite unemployment rates of over 25%,
and 1.1million went into industrial promotion, in effect for the attraction
of foreign investment. This was clearly the chosen route of economic
development.
Multilateral Relations – With independence
Jamaica gained membership to the United Nations (UN) and the financial
institutions of the Bretton Woods system, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Within these organizations Jamaica’s
membership was at times qualified, for example, on instances when
participation in special committees and executive bodies could only
take place in designated groups or through the representation of Jamaica
by more powerful members. In the UN Jamaica consistently voted with
the west, especially on contentious issues in the context of the Cold
War, the only departure being on issues of African liberation. As
an indication of the government’s determination to be non-oppositional
towards the western powers, the advice given to the permanent representative
of Jamaica to the UN was to “vote like Canada whenever uncertain”.
Jamaica did take a stance on more politically correct issues, such
as human rights. In fact, Jamaica was responsible for the motion that
brought into effect the UN International Human Rights Year. Jamaica
also advocated for special attention to be paid to the economic development
needs of small islands, an issue that received “a modest amount
of attention”. On the related note of diplomatic relations,
fully accredited diplomatic missions were only established in the
western cities of London, Washington and Ottawa, as well as the UN.
A consulate was established in New York to service the large population
of Jamaicans living there as well as to secure investment capital.
In the late 1960s, due to high demand, a consulate was established
in Ethiopia while an invitation for diplomatic relations from the
Soviet Union was denied.
Caribbean Relations – Jamaica, not dissimilar
to other “bigger states” in the english-speaking Caribbean,
carefully guarded its sovereignty despite an early dependence on regional
strategies and the easy likelihood of the outside world viewing Jamaica
and the other states within the Caribbean as one grouping. A weariness
towards any federalist approach persisted in Jamaica’s foreign
policy - the legacy of a failed attempt towards Caribbean federation
as championed by Norman Washington Manley, the leader of the opposition
party, the People’s National Party (PNP). Yet, an important
aspect of Lewis’s economic development strategy was the establishment
of a customs union to assist in overcoming some of the obstacles posed
by the smallness island economies. William Demas resuscitated this
aspect of Lewis’s theory with the help of other regionalist
advocates, and by 1968 the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA)
was established with Jamaica as a member. Jamaica played an active
role in the negotiations with Europe vis-à-vis Britain concerning
preferential trade between that region and the Caribbean. These talks
were advanced as a response to Britain’s failure to gain access
to the European Economic Community, as a result of a membership block
posed by France. Concerns throughout the Caribbean were that Britain’s
ouster from the community would put the islands at a disadvantage
in trading with larger Europe.
Cuba – Regarding relations with Cuba, which
would become an integral aspect of Jamaican foreign policy in the
future, the government fully supported the position of the United
States and maintained no diplomatic ties with their northern neighbor.
Jamaica was also active in enforcing the embargo.
Period B: 1972-1980
The only hope is Change – Challenging the World Order
Part 1
Context
By the early 1970s most formerly colonized countries of the Caribbean,
Africa and Asia had gained their independence, to the extent that
the ratio of industrialized developed countries to formerly colonized
developing countries was beginning to tip in the favor of the latter
group. As the ranks of developing countries grew, the discontent and
malaise felt within these countries at the slow pace of progress and
the inequality in distribution of the gains that had been made thus
far also grew. The theories and approaches previously taken towards
development came under question, and in some cases under harsh critique.
In the Caribbean, an association of intellectuals and professionals
called the New World Group (NWG), critiqued elements of both Lewis
and Demas’s approach to development. NWG contended that Lewis
and Demas, along with most of their contemporaries, had ignored the
inherent disadvantages that small dependent economies were placed
at in the exploitation of their own natural resources.
A new focus was drawn to the relationship between formerly colonized,
developing and dependent nations and the nations of the metropolis,
industrialized and developed. This relationship was characterized
as exploitative; with the only route to meaningful development for
dependent states being that of greater self-reliance and collaboration
with each other. This school of thought, dependency theory, first
took root in Latin America, where the prescriptions of Raul Prebisch
were attacked along similar lines as Lewis. The school spread from
Latin America to Africa and Asia and also to the Caribbean where the
NWG incorporated their own original analysis relating to the particulars
of plantation economy and society. Jamaica, along with Guyana and
Trinidad, served as one of the three Caribbean centers of the dependency
debate. Political leaders in these three countries, as well as in
Grenada, made attempts to concretize and apply to economic and foreign
policy the principles of dependency school.
Within this context, formerly colonized Third World countries became
more assertive in the international arena and sought to exercise their
power though collective action. Smaller and weaker states, seeing
their strength in numbers, formed alliances through which they could
push for change and challenge the established world order at multilateral
fora. This belief in collective action was an integral aspect of Jamaica’s
foreign policy during the 1970’s as the Prime Minister at the
time, Michael Manley, envisioned not just a Jamaican international
strategy but also a “Third World strategy”.
Ideology – The stated ideology of the Jamaican government
throughout this period, under the leadership of Michael Manley and
the People’s National Party, was Democratic Socialism. This
ideology underpinned the policy making process as it pertained to
both the domestic and international spheres. In fact, for the leadership,
the both spheres were closely intertwined. In Persaud’s interpretation
it was Manley’s view that “Jamaican foreign policy must
be aimed at changing the world, for it is only thus that real changes
can be accomplished at the domestic level.” In short, it can
be said that the aim of democratic socialism or the vision behind
the ideology was the creation of a more economically and politically
equitable Jamaica and indeed, world; a vision that necessitated a
bucking of the world order. Manley and his party situated the government’s
foreign policy in direct opposition to the policy that had been pursued
since independence. In the Principles and Objectives of the PNP circulated
circa 1972, the foreign policy of the country up until that point
was described as “a servile relationship with imperialism”.
By pinning the country’s foreign policy to the ideology of democratic
socialism the newly elected government purposefully distanced itself
from the close relations that had been established with the west and
opened itself to new alliances with countries of the Third World.
International Economic Relations – It has been asserted
that one of the more significant successes of this era of Jamaican
foreign policy was the establishment of the International Bauxite
Association (IBA) in 1972. The IBA was a cartel style organization,
inspired by OPEC and intended to garner greater bargaining power for
bauxite producing countries. Its membership included Australia, Guinea,
Guyana, Surinam and Yugoslavia. Jamaica was not only a founding member
of the IBA but a critical driving force behind the conceptualization
of the association. For the PNP and Manley the IBA represented a step
in the right direction of countering the exploitative relations between
industrial capital, multinational companies and Third World resources.
The IBA may have inspired other cartel like Commodity Producers Associations.
It was not universally well received however - Henry Kissinger, the
then United States Secretary of State, was greatly opposed to the
IBA. The formation of the IBA in addition to the bauxite levy that
Manley had imposed on foreign owned aluminum companies in Jamaica
in an attempt to increase the percentage of sales revenue remaining
in the country greatly upset the North American bauxite interests.
As a result, there was a dramatic decrease in bauxite production,
of 33% from 1974 to 1976, as a substantial portion of production was
diverted away from Jamaica.
Multilateral Relations – The PNP government
adopted a high profile approach to participation in multilateral organizations,
in many cases assuming a leadership role. For example, the country’s
representative to the UN in New York was selected by the Secretary-General
in 1975 to serve as a member of a group of experts charged with the
restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the organization.
Along similar lines, the representative to the UN Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) was elected president of that council in 1978. There
were also significant successes on issues of the Law of the Sea. A
Jamaican, Dr. Kenneth Rattray, assumed the rapporteur position at
a critical UN conference held on that topic and the country eventually
secured the location of the International Seabed Authority. Throughout
these talks Jamaica was able to further the interests of the wider
Caribbean region and was said to have played a role of coordination
and “building bridges”.
Throughout this period the government was most active in North-South
issues, inspired by a notion of Third World “solidarism”.
Don Mills relates that Jamaica was one of a small number of developing
countries invited to attend the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation, held in Paris between 1976 and 1977, and a year later
Prime Minister Manley presided over a meeting in Jamaica which was
attended by a number of heads of state to discuss the situation regarding
the New International Economic Order (NIEO) – this was in fact,
“the very first North-South Summit”. Perhaps most significantly,
the PNP foreign policy approach included full participation and support
of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The country held a seat on the
Coordinating Bureau of the NAM, which allowed it to act as a broker
between “countries with divergent perspectives” and to
further “reconcile their positions with the objectives of the
Movement”. NAM meetings were used to prepare countries for the
G77 bloc negotiations within the UN Trade and Development Conference
(UNCTAD) and elsewhere. Jamaica played a pivotal role in these fora,
often as chair or chief negotiator of the G77 countries.
On the diplomatic relations front, Manley’s PNP government established
full diplomatic relations with Cuba, broke off relation with Taiwan
and sent trade missions to eastern bloc countries as well as China.
Missions were also sent to numerous African countries, in many instances
for the very first time. Funds were contributed to the African States
Liberation fund and imports were banned from Portugal and its African
colonies.
Caribbean Relations – During this period CARIFTA
was “deepened” into the Caribbean Community (CARICOM),
which the Jamaican government fully signed on to. The Treaty of Chaguaramas
calls for “the harmonization or coordination of foreign policy”
among member states. Jamaica sometimes aided and sometimes harmed
this movement towards foreign policy harmonization. The country sometimes
championed the cause of the wider region, as it did on Law of the
Sea issues and throughout the first successful Lome negotiations with
Europe, which concluded in 1975 and in which the government played
a significant role. At other times the Jamaican government was seen
as acting out of its own selfish interests. For instance, in the Financial
Times on November 6, 1975, Quentin Peel stated, “It is his [Manley’s]
wooing of both Mexico and Venezuela which has alienated the other
regimes of the English Caribbean, particularly Dr. Eric Williams in
Trinidad. Both Latin countries are now deeply involved in major Jamaican
investment projects.” Manley, in his commitment to south-south
relations, often went above and beyond the heads of his closest neighbors.
Cuba – The geopolitical and strategic importance
of Cuba during this era cannot be overlooked. In fact, Jamaica’s
relations to the United States and the west on a whole were perhaps
most greatly influenced by Jamaica’s position and actions vis-à-vis
Cuba. As mentioned above, Manley’s government established full
diplomatic relations with Cuba, and furthermore, the Prime Minister
developed a close rapport with the Cuban leader, Fidel Castro. Where
Jamaica could be of material assistance to Cuba Manley sought to strengthen
ties, in 1974 trade relations were opened and in 1975 the Prime Minister
with Foreign Minister Thompson and an entourage of PNP leaders, government
officials, private sector representatives and media persons paid an
official visit to Cuba to bolster exchange between the two islands.
Where material assistance was not possible Manley lent support through
“sensitive symbolic diplomacy”. For example, a Cuban plane
carrying troops to the liberation wars in southern Africa stopped
off at the Norman Manley International airport in Kingston while en
route. This action served no purpose other than to extend Jamaica’s
symbolic support of Cuba’s involvement in the liberation wars.
The close ties between Jamaica and Cuba were the cause of much domestic
and international debate. Leader of the opposition, Edward Seaga,
often claimed that the region was under communist threat from the
“red triangle” being erected between Havana, Cuba, Georgetown,
Guyana and Kingston, Jamaica. Speculations were that this triangle
was closely linked to the “Soviet loop”. Despite building
controversy the government maintained its ties and close relations
with Cuba. According to Persaud, a key aspect of Manley’s foreign
relations was a reconfiguration of the “signifying chain or
system of equivalence” associated with Cuba. The pre-1972 chain
of Cuba = communism = repression = totalitarianism = terror = Castro
was actively disputed, and in its place a new chain was established
with Cuba = anti-imperialist = Non-Aligned = Third World leader =
freedom fighters = neighbor = Fidel.
Period B: 1972-1980
Retreat and Surrender – The World Order is Resistant
Part 2
Context
The PNP government’s very active position in international affairs
and high profile resulted in mixed reactions. According to Don Mills,
“in many quarters outside of the country it brought, for the
most part, very positive and favorable reactions. But at home the
government was severely criticized by the JLP for some of its activities
and policies and for its alleged neglect of domestic issues”.
Criticism of the government’s foreign policy was not limited
to the opposition party, and in the later years of Manley’s
PNP government contentions grew both at home and abroad over issues
such as the management of debt, relations with the western powers
and alignment with Cuba. It has been suggested that the leadership’s
decisions and performance in the international sphere contributed
most significantly to the demise of its government, as evidenced by
its failure to garner a re-election in 1980.
Leading up to the 1980 election the government attempted a rapprochement
with the United States and entered into a courtship with the IMF,
two actions that registered as an about-face in light of stances previously
taken. The good will engendered between the Jamaican government and
the western powers was short-lived as important other aspects of Jamaica’s
foreign policy remained to the left of what would be tolerated. Furthermore,
the 1979 international climate of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan,
leftist inspired Sandinista (Nicaragua) and FSLN (El Salvador) rebellions
in South America and the resurgence of “hyper liberal economic
orthodoxy” in America and Britain, ensured that Manley and the
Jamaican government’s foreign policy approach of Third World
solidarism and democratic socialism would not be tolerated for much
longer.
Rapprochement with the United States – From
1977-1980 much energy was spent on “normalizing relations”
with the United States. This was a considerably easier task because
of the election of President Jimmy Carter who pledged to tolerate
ideological pluralism in the region. Foreign Minister Patterson paid
regular visits to Washington, paving the way for the successive 1977
visits of Rosalyn Carter, the first lady, and Andrew Young, the United
States permanent representative to the UN. Shortly after these visits
President Carter wrote a letter to Prime Minister Manley in which
he gave his “tacit approval” to the ideals of democratic
socialism. Relations between the two countries were considerably strengthened,
but the honeymoon was not long lasting.
The Relationship with the IMF – The international
oil crisis of 1973-1974 coupled with the state expenditure costs of
the PNP government’s social reforms had detrimental effects
on the Jamaican economy. Import bills soared, as did accompanying
public debt. Prime Minister Manley turned to the IMF in the troughs
of economic crisis despite the major recommendation made in the Emergency
Production Plan (EPP) to take a route of greater self-reliance. The
EPP, also called the “People’s Plan”, was written
by the National Planning Agency and incorporated the contributions
of thousands of Jamaicans, garnered from both written proposals and
motions made at numerous meetings held across the island. The effort
was not able to persuade Manley to take a truly more socialist route
to development. Instead, Manley successfully petitioned for the support
of the Prime Ministers of Australia, Canada (Trudeau) and Britain
(Callaghan) in his attempt to secure an “agreeable” rescue
package from the IMF. The first package was in fact agreeable to the
Jamaican government, but after two subsequent failed tests in December
of 1977 and December of 1979, new terms had to be negotiated and much
harsher conditions were imposed on Jamaica. Manley’s lasting
sentiment was that the IMF recipe could never work for an economy
like Jamaica’s, “so structurally dependent” and
“so lacking in productive capability”. One of the last
foreign policy efforts of the government, early in 1980, was a joint
conference between Jamaica and Tanzania on the international monetary
system. At this conference the Arusha Initiative was drawn up, which
inter alia condemned the policies of the IMF as a means of political
intervention.
Cuba: The Last Straw – Despite efforts being
made to “normalize” relations with the United States and
to secure emergency funding from a primarily western institution,
Manley persisted in the one aspect of Jamaica’s foreign policy
that placed the greatest strain on the island’s relationship
with the United States – that is, vocal and unapologetic support
of Cuba. Manley consistently expressed support for the Cuban regime
and for its leader, Fidel Castro. This expressed support on three
matters in particular made relations with the United States especially
tense, a) the matter of Cuban troops in Angola fighting for the liberation
of that country, b) the demand for the return of the territory occupied
at Guantanamo as a United States military base to the people of Cuba,
and c) the matter of the termination of the embargo. Jamaica’s
activities around these three issues made the United States particularly
uncomfortable. The last straw came in 1979 at the sixth NAM Summit
being held in Havana. In a speech he delivered before hundreds of
Cubans, Manley spoke out passionately on the ills of imperialism and
extolled the virtues of Castro’s Cuba and the Soviet model.
In light of the events that were transpiring in the world at that
moment as well as the attacks being waged within the United States
against Carter’s more pluralist approach, which was being perceived
as too lenient and weak, Manley’s speech had the effect of revoking
any tolerance than the United States had been willing to grant the
country. The attitude towards Jamaica became one of: you’ve
made your bed – now lie in it.
Period C: 1980-1988
We’re with the West, Again – Working within the World
Order
Part 1
Context
The period of the 1980s was marked by a swing of the ideological pendulum,
from the left position of the late 1960s and 1970s back to the center
and right of center. This swing was reflected in the election of center
and right of center governments in Europe, North America and the Caribbean.
Most significantly for Jamaica, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan
were elected to office in Great Britain and the United States respectively.
In this new climate negative attitudes toward North-South dialogue
and the proposals concerning the NIEO were “strongly confirmed”.
In a reaction to the challenges that were being posed to the United
States’ world hegemony that had existed since the end of World
War II, Reagan sought to reassert authority by practicing the “twin
principles of ‘monetarism’ and ‘militarism’”.
This was of particular consequence for the Caribbean, as where the
United States fell short in reestablishing a world order it sought
to gain control of the politics and political economy of the Caribbean,
the perceived backyard of its domain.
This era also marked the end of multilateralism as it had been previously
practiced and employed in the international community. This retreat
was heralded by President Reagan’s assertion that the United
States would no longer allow itself to be bullied, either in respect
to bilateral or multilateral issues, especially by small developing
countries. Don Mills theorizes that this retreat can best be understood
as a reaction on the part of industrialized developed countries to
the growing influence that developing countries were gaining in multilateral
fora, as they realized their strength in numbers and the resources
they contained. A shift that began to occur in this era and is still
evident today is the tendency of larger and more developed countries
to take a regionalist approach to negotiations with developing countries,
instead of working through multilateral fora. The 1980s was also marked
by political turbulence, and a continuation of struggles from the
decade prior led to an atmosphere of unrest and uncertainty. Indicatively,
the situation in southern Africa reached a boiling point and a number
of dramatic developments in the Caribbean, spanning from Haiti to
Grenada, confirmed fears in the United States that the region was
indeed a “trouble spot”, warranting careful monitoring
and regulation.
The international economic environment also contributed to a sense
of pessimism. Early in the decade the world moved into a recession
that is generally regarded as the worst since the 1930s. Later in
the decade the stock market crashed in New York and London, as well
as numerous other world centers. The bad state of the world economy
seemed to have particularly detrimental effects on small island economies
such as Jamaica and economic survival became even more so the main
imperative of foreign policy.
Ideology – In Anthony Payne’s analysis
Edward Seaga, as the leader of the JLP and the Prime Minister throughout
the 1980s, was the first Jamaican leader to explicitly acknowledge
the importance of the United States and its prescriptions for the
Caribbean, clearly moving beyond a broader conceptualization of the
west and choosing the United States as a focal point. Some have argued
that the approach of this era was simply, “we’re with
the west, again” but a more accurate portrayal of the governing
ideology underpinning Jamaica’s 1980s foreign policy would read
along the lines of, “we’re with the United States”.
Prime Minister Seaga sought out a “special relationship”
with the United States and with Ronald Reagan personally. As such,
he was dubbed “Reagan’s man in the Caribbean” or
“America’s man in the Caribbean”. It is well known
that Seaga was the first head of state to be invited to the White
House by a newly elected President Regan. Seaga’s rise to leadership
of the Jamaican government was well received in Washington, mainly
because it was believed that this man of Harvard education would be
a staunch follower of the neo-liberal prescription for economic growth
in the region. It was expected that he would be a supported of the
structural adjustment programmes ascribed to by the key financial
institutions. What can be said is that Seaga was opposed to communism,
socialism and the like, and that in rhetoric he espoused an ideology
of openness and liberalization, very much in tune with the “powers
that be” of the day.
International Economic Relations – Like his
predecessor Seaga turned to the IMF for financial assistance. In this
case announcements of cut backs in aluminum production by two major
companies, Alcoa and Reynolds, took a toll on the Jamaican economy.
Seaga was able to capitalize on his good relationship with the Reagan
administration in his negotiations with the IMF. Favorable IMF packages
were provided on multiple occasions and conditions, such as the ceiling
placed on government borrowing, restrictions on private sector borrowing
and currency devaluation stipulations were considerably less harsh
than experienced in the past. At least, this was the case in the first
instances. Furthermore, President Reagan set up a special office and
commissioned David Rockefellar, then chairman of Chase Bank, to mobilize
private sector funding for Jamaican development. This effort met with
minimal success as investor confidence was slow in building. In short,
the Jamaican economic foreign policy, under the leadership of Seaga
and the JLP, entailed unquestionable allegiance to the United States
in return for financial patronage and significant concessions.
Multilateral Relations – Jamaica’s allegiance
to the United States was made evident through the country’s
multilateral relations. Even before assuming the position of Prime
Minister in Jamaica Seaga was active in fostering United States leadership
in multilateral fora. At a breakfast meeting held in Washington during
September of 1977 Seaga called for the formation of a conservative
equivalent of the Socialist International, he stated that this was
yet “another area of leadership and another area of influence
for the United States”. Seaga’s calls did not go unanswered
as during this era the International Democratic Union was established
with both Reagan and Thatcher giving their strong backing. In the
assessment of Don Mills Jamaica’s foreign policy in the 1980s
“by no means indicated the strong attitude displayed in the
1970s towards North-South issues”. Issues such as the NIEO were
placed on the “back-burner” and the previous active role
and high profile of the country’s foreign policy was noticeably
limited. Mills attributes this shift, at least in part, to the fact
that while in opposition the JLP and Seaga loudly critiqued the government
for pursuing international objectives at the cost of domestic issues.
A somewhat active role was maintained in the UN, particularly in the
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and
the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Matters of global environment
and human settlements were also pursued by the government in UN fora
and Seaga earned international acclaim for his attention paid to environmental
issues. There were a few disappointments that involved schisms within
the Caribbean region. For example, there was a failed attempt to gain
a position on the International Court of Justice, on which a seat
was ultimately granted to a Guyanese official. Also the Jamaican candidate
for the Presidency of the General Assembly in 1988 had to eventually
remove his candidacy when the Caribbean as a region decided to give
its support to a Barbadian candidate.
Caribbean Relations – Seaga and the JLP were
not alone in the Caribbean region in their embrace of the neo-liberal
prescriptions for economic growth and development. In 1984 the CARICOM
countries drafted and signed the Nassau Understanding, which effectively
endorsed the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) being pushed
by “the nexus” of the IMF, World Bank and United States
Agency for International Development (USAID). Payne and Sutton call
attention to the fact that the SAPs were endorsed at just the time
when the social costs of their implementation were beginning to be
felt by developing countries across the globe. It seems that the CARICOM
states felt strongly enough to endorse the programmes despite the
criticisms that were being waged against their effectiveness and the
high price of human suffering that these programmes were perceived
to have exacted.
Seaga played the role of championing the cause of the United States
in the region. He played a prominent role in the establishment of
the Caribbean Democratic Union, an affiliate of the international
organization. Most importantly he advocated for President Reagan’s
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), extolling the virtues of the initiative
along the lines of free entry to the markets of the United States
(with important exceptions), incentives for encouraging investment
and a sizeable increase in aid and technical assistance. The Jamaican
government also made a proposal for a CARICOM-Canadian agreement along
similar lines as the CBI, the CARIBCAN. Similar to the previous government
the JLP and Seaga took an active interest in the Lome Accords and
were heavily involved in the renegotiation of the terms of that agreement
throughout the 1980s. Deputy Prime Minister Shearer represented the
government’s interests in Brussels throughout that renegotiation
process.
Cuba and Grenada – On coming to office Seaga
almost immediately expelled the Cuban ambassador from Jamaica, and
within one year of taking over the leadership of the government all
trade ties to Cuba had been severed. The pro-United States foreign
policy certainly extended to issues pertaining to Cuba. In fact, Seaga
and the JLP had been vigilant in their anti-Cuba/anti-Fidel rhetoric
throughout Manley and the PNP’s reign over the government, and
once in power their foreign policy towards Cuba reflected their long
held negative sentiment towards communism.
Another matter of critical importance was that of the Grenada invasion.
Grenada’s revolutionary government represented in the Caribbean
psyche the very last bastion of anything resembling the previous Jamaican
government’s democratic socialism. When the United States invaded
Grenada in 1983 the Jamaican government aided the effort by providing
personnel. The revolution was successfully brought down by the invasion
and on the heels of this success the JLP called a snap election, which
the PNP boycotted and the JLP subsequently won all seats by default.
Seaga was able to point to the defeat of leftist politics and economics
in Grenada as the final demise of all such ideological leanings in
the region. The invasion also made evident the unqualified hegemony
that the United States now exercised in the region.
Period C: 1980-1988
Limits to Western Cooperation – Finding Space to Maneuver within
the World Order
Part 2
Context
Similar to the previous government, the JLP and Seaga in the latter
part of their leadership of the country made certain decisions and
took certain actions that could be read as an about-face when looked
at in relation to the foreign policy positions previously taken. The
mid to late 1980s was marked by a strong backlash against the neo-liberal
prescriptions of the United States and the IMF/World Bank/USAID nexus.
In numerous camps it was felt that the medicine being dished out by
the great power too often did more harm than good. Despite its strong
pro-United States rhetoric, not even the Jamaican government was impervious
to this strong current of public opinion and protest.
The Relationship with the IMF – By the mid 1980s the cozy honeymoon
that had existed between the Jamaican government and the Reagan administration
and IMF staff came to a conclusion. After failing to meet the standards
set out by several successive IMF performance tests, and after Prime
Minister Seaga fully exhausted the option of traveling to Washington
to personally secure a waiver and more time to meet the goals laid
out by the IMF, the Jamaican government fell out of favor with the
powers that be in Washington. From then on Jamaica was subjected to
harsher conditions on loan packages, conditions that were reminiscent
of those enforced in the 1970s. It was at this point that the once
avid supporter of the Reagan administration and the IMF, Prime Minister
Seaga, began to speak out against the prescribed economic policies.
At the IMF annual conference held in Seoul circa 1985, Seaga gave
a speech indicting the “huge toll in human suffering”
that had been exacted in Jamaica as a result of the “over hasty
reforms of the IMF”. On other occasions Seaga leveled “strong
criticisms” at some of the policies of the Fund, although it
can be argued that he continued to support the broad approach of the
institution. In regard to Jamaica in particular Seaga argued that
the Fund’s perception of the situation in the country was “unfair
and unfavorable”.
A Reverse of Neo-Liberal Economics – The mid 1980s was marked
by a departure from the neo-liberal economic doctrine previously ascribed
to, at least in rhetoric and posturing, by the Jamaican government.
Up until that point an important aspect of the economic foreign policy
of the JLP government was expressed agreement with the neo-liberal
rhetoric and conservative approach to economic management espoused
by the United Sates under Reagan. Seaga departed from this neo-liberal
doctrine through a number of actions, he rolled out an expanded budget
with increased state expenditure including subsidies and price controls
for basic foods, animal feed and cement, and he also slashed interest
rates and established regulatory control of the Jamaican dollar. Seaga’s
attempts at economic resuscitation were greatly aided by a drop in
oil prices and an increase in bauxite and tourism revenues.
Period D: 1989/90-Present
The Need to Diversify – The World Order Shifts Dramatically
Context
If the post Cold War era can be characterized as one of significant
geopolitical shifts, dramatic new developments and an unprecedented
opening up of the established world order, then one might view the
changes as inauspicious for a small state such as Jamaica in that
its own interests will fall through the newly opened spaces. Hey asserts
that the ending of the Cold War has brought both positives and negatives
for small states. Good in that small peripheral states are no longer
facing the risk of becoming insignificant pawns in a larger power
struggle between two world powers, and bad in that the strategic importance
of many small states vis-à-vis the powers that establish the
new world order has substantially diminished. Small states can no
longer play ideologically warring superpowers off each other to their
benefit. In short, the small state is guaranteed less attention and
concern in the post Cold War world.
Jamaica, and the wider Caribbean region, has been de-prioritized on
the agenda of most of the world’s power centers. Following the
collapse of the Berlin Wall the European bloc has had to turn its
focus inward, deepening its integration process with the signing of
the Single European Act (SEA) and channeling its energy and resources
towards the democratization, liberalization and rebuilding of Central
and Eastern Europe. The United States has also turned its interests
elsewhere, to Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and most significantly
to the North American region with the signing of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). According to Anthony Payne, the two
most significant developments for Jamaica on the international scene
has been the signing of the SEA in Europe and the inauguration of
the NAFTA in the United States.
The United States, as the Jamaican government’s patron of choice
from the previous era, indicated from early in the 1990s that it would
be dealing with the Caribbean as a small part of the wider Latin American
region. This was evidenced by President George Bush Senior’s
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI). The Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA) talks, which were subsequently launched, further
the tendency of the hemisphere hegemon to regard the Caribbean and
Latin America as one unified grouping. By this logic, the smaller
states of the Caribbean must compete with the larger and more developed
states of the Latin American continent, states such as Brazil. In
short, the post Cold War international environment is one in which
less has been guaranteed for states such as Jamaica, and one in which
fierce competition accompanies any attempt made by a country to secure
its own interests.
Ideology – The ideology underpinning Jamaica’s
foreign policy has continued to be one of openness and liberalization,
though this has been tended to have been clouded by populist political
rhetoric that often harks back to the seventies. For the most part,
Manley and then Patterson have expanded on the general policy direction
of the previous JLP government, regarding an acknowledgement of the
importance of the United States and its prescriptions for the region
as well as exhibiting a willingness to work within the dominant neo-liberal
free trade paradigm. While making an attempt to adhere to the discipline
of the free trade regime Jamaica has sought to argue its case for
continued “special and differential treatment” and preservation
of preferential linkages. An important aspect of the rationale behind
Jamaica’s foreign policy is that as a small and vulnerable developing
economy Jamaica ought to be guaranteed some preferential access to
markets, along with other concessions. This is a critical sticking
point for the country’s foreign policy as this period marks
the expiration of most of its preferential trade agreements. These
include: the Lomé Accord first negotiated between ACP countries
and Europe in 1975 and renewed for four successive periods, the Caribbean
Basin Initiative established in 1982/83 and the Caribbean-Canadian
preferences first negotiated in 1986.
International Economic Relations – A significant aspect
of the economic foreign policy has remained centered around the management
of relations with international financial institutions and lending
bodies. The management of international trade has become increasingly
important and challenging for the government. The World Trade Organization
(WTO) banana dispute concerning English ACP banana producers, including
Jamaica, and their preferential access to European markets, painfully
exhibited the deteriorating prospects for Jamaica and the wider Caribbean
region in the traditional trading arena. As a result, Jamaica has
had to put considerable energy towards the exploration of new trading
avenues, though the extent to which this energy has yielded tangible
results is questionable.
Caribbean Relations – The Caribbean’s
post 1990 “new regionalism”, as it has been termed by
Anthony Payne, can be seen as an attempt to simultaneously widen and
deepen already existing regional ties. The Association of Caribbean
States (ACS), an organization that was prompted by the 1992 West Indian
Commission report highlighting the need for closer Caribbean-Latin
America relations, has taken on the task of widening regional efforts.
Other efforts at fostering closer Caribbean-Latin American integration
have been initiated by business interests, such as the Washington
based Caribbean/Latin American Action (C/LAA) group, whereas some
efforts have been championed by the region’s governments, for
example, the Caribbean Basin Technical Advisory Group (CBTAG) set
up by Puerto Rican President Hernandez Colon. Prime Minister Manley
was particularly given to efforts of Caribbean-Latin American collaboration.
More recently, the Patterson government has been active in efforts
towards deepening Caribbean integration. These efforts include the
Caribbean Single Market Economy and the Caribbean Court of Justice.
It is however questionable the extent to which these initiatives will
result in positive growth, whether directly or indirectly, for the
domestic economy.
Braveboy-Wagner (among others) asserts that in the post-Cold War era
considerable attention has been paid to Caribbean regionalism as a
route to economic development and as an overall economic strategy.
It has been suggested that the Caribbean is being forced to look inward
and the latest thrust of regional integration has not been as a result
of the region’s own design, but out of the perception of there
being no other option. Along these lines the Regional Negotiating
Machinery (CRNM) was established in 1997 to “oversee the process
of negotiating trade agreements with key external countries and integration
movements”. The Caribbean has attempted to lobby for the continuation
of ACP-EU trading preferences and to make an application for NAFTA
parity. But the ACP-EU trading system is on a gradual but definite
track of being phased out, and the CARICOM request for NAFTA parity
was blocked ardently by labour interests in the US Congress (an obstacle
that did not hinder Jamaica from making a separate albeit unsuccessful
bid for entrance into the trading bloc.) It seems that with the closing
of one door the Caribbean has sought to open another – the door
to more meaningful Caribbean regionalism, though again, what this
could and will mean for Jamaican domestic economic growth is questionable. |
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